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According to the Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) condition, interest
rate di⁄erentials compensate for expected exchange rate changes, equaliz-
ing the expected returns from holding assets which only di⁄er in terms of
currency denomination. In the previous literature, there are many tests
of UIP for industrialized countries, and, more recently, some tests for
emerging economies. However, due to data availability problems, poorer
developing countries have not been studied. This paper tests UIP in a
partially dollarized economy, Bolivia, where bank accounts only di⁄er in
terms of currency denomination (U.S. dollars or bolivianos). I ￿nd that
UIP does not hold in Bolivia, but that the deviations are smaller than in
most other studies of developed and emerging economies. Moreover, sev-
eral factors seem to contribute to the deviations from UIP. The so-called
peso problem could possibly account for the observed data, but there is
also evidence of a time-varying risk premium, as well as deviations from
rational expectations.
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11 Introduction
The Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) condition states that interest rate di⁄er-
entials compensate for expected exchange rate changes, thereby equalizing the
expected returns from holding any two currencies. UIP is a cornerstone assump-
tion in open-economy macroeconomic models, but there is substantial evidence
that the condition fails to hold empirically. Moreover, imposing UIP or not
matters signi￿cantly for the quantitative results in dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models, as shown for example by Adolfson, LasØen, LindØ,
and Villani (2008).
There is an extensive empirical literature which tests UIP.1 Ideally, empirical
tests of UIP should use interest rates on assets which are identical in every
respect except currency denomination. Otherwise, deviations from UIP can
be due to ￿political risk￿ , i.e. deviations from Covered Interest Parity due
to the presence or possible imposition of capital controls.2 Data availability
is not a problem for developed countries and emerging markets where euro-
currency interest rates and/or forward exchange rates exist. Therefore, almost
all previous papers study industrialized countries (and to some extent emerging
markets) rather than poorer, developing countries where such data do not exist.
The contribution of this paper is to ￿ll this gap in the literature by studying
a partially dollarized developing country, Bolivia, where deposits in di⁄erent
currencies only di⁄er in terms of currency denomination and not in terms of
political risk. The idea is to test UIP by using interest rates on assets in the
same location (Bolivia) which only di⁄er in terms of currency denomination
(bolivianos and US dollars). This approach is analogous to the method used
by Asplund and Friberg (2001) who test the Law of One Price by using prices
1For literature surveys, see Froot and Thaler (1990), Engel (1996), Isard (2006) and Chinn
(2006).
2See Aliber (1973) and Dooley and Isard (1980).
2on goods in the same location (Scandinavian duty-free stores) which only di⁄er
in terms of currency nomination (Swedish kronor and Finnish markka). In
both cases, the idea is to use good data to construct a clean test of theoretical
predictions.
A similar paper by Poghosyan, Kocenda, and Zemcik (2008) uses data from
another partially dollarized developing economy (Armenia) to test UIP. My
paper is di⁄erent in a number of ways. First, I have a 50% larger data set with
12 years of weekly data. This diminishes the risk of small-sample bias. Second,
Bolivia has had a ￿xed exchange rate regime (crawling peg against the U.S.
dollar) rather than a freely ￿ oating exchange rate. Previous papers have found
di⁄erences in the extent of UIP deviations between countries with ￿xed and
￿ oating exchange rates, which makes it interesting to study di⁄erent regimes.
Third, I study the ability of several possible factors to explain the deviations
from UIP (time-varying risk premia, the so-called peso problem and deviations
from rational expectations).
The main result of this paper is that UIP is rejected in the case of Bolivia.
However, the rejection is less clear than in most previous studies of developed
countries or emerging markets. In particular, there is no sign of any ￿forward
premium puzzle￿ , i.e. the common empirical result that high interest-rate cur-
rencies tend to appreciate (rather than depreciate as predicted by UIP). Another
￿nding is that several di⁄erent factors seem to contribute to the deviations from
UIP.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theory
behind UIP as well as the previous empirical evidence. In section 3, I describe
the most important candidate explanations for empirical deviations from UIP,
with a special focus on methods for empirical testing. Section 4 presents the
data set and the main empirical analysis, while section 5 empirically investigates
3alternative explanations for deviations from UIP in Bolivia. Finally, section 6
concludes the paper.
2 The UIP hypothesis and previous empirical
tests
In this section, I ￿rst describe the UIP hypothesis and derive a regression equa-
tion which is often used for empirical testing. Then I summarize the previous
empirical literature.
2.1 The UIP hypothesis
Perhaps the most well-known theoretical relationship between interest-rate dif-
ferentials and expected currency depreciation is known as Uncovered Interest
Parity (UIP). If investors are risk-neutral and have rational expectations, inter-
est rate di⁄erentials should compensate for expected depreciations so that the
expected returns from holding any two currencies are equal. More formally, the
UIP hypothesis can be expressed as:





where it and i￿
t are domestic and foreign interest rates with maturity k at time
t, and St is the exchange rate at time t (expressed as domestic currency units
per unit of foreign currency, so that an increase means a depreciation of the
domestic currency). Taking logs of both sides of equation (1) gives :





4Expected exchange rates are not directly observable, so it is not possible to use
equation (2) as a basis for empirical testing. Assuming rational expectations,
using the approximation that ln(1+x) is close to x for small x and rearranging
gives:
st+k ￿ st = it ￿ i￿
t + "t+k (3)
where st ￿ ln(St) and "t+k is a rational expectations forecast error.3
Hence, in the regression:
st+k ￿ st = ￿ + ￿(it ￿ i￿
t) + "t+k (4)
the coe¢ cient values are ￿ = 0 and, in particular, ￿ = 1, under the UIP hy-
pothesis. A positive interest rate di⁄erential in favor of the domestic currency
should, on average, be associated with a future depreciation of the domestic cur-
rency of equal magnitude. Ex-post returns from holding di⁄erent currencies will
di⁄er, but only because of random rational expectations errors in the exchange
rate forecasts.
An equivalent empirical speci￿cation could be obtained by replacing the in-
terest di⁄erential on the right-hand side of equation (4) by the forward premium,
i.e. the percentage di⁄erence between the forward and spot exchange rates. A
forward premium means that the foreign currency is more expensive (sells at
a premium) on the forward market than on today￿ s spot market, i.e. the k-
period log forward exchange rate, ft;t+k, is higher than the current log spot
exchange rate, st. The equivalence between the interest di⁄erential and the
forward premium is known as Covered Interest Parity (CIP), and holds very
well empirically (except perhaps during periods of ￿nancial market turmoil, as
shown by, for example, Baba and Packer (2008)). CIP is an arbitrage condition
3The derivation ignores a Jensen￿ s inequality term, which is very small empirically (see
Engel (1996) for a discussion and references).
5and thus holds even if investors are not risk neutral.4
2.2 Previous empirical tests of UIP
Equation (4) has been estimated in a large number of studies, for di⁄erent
countries and time periods.5 In almost every study, the estimated ￿ coe¢ cient
is signi￿cantly smaller than one, which is the value predicted by UIP. In fact,
￿ is often estimated to be negative. Froot (1990) reports an average estimate
across a large number of studies of -0.88, which constitutes strong evidence
against UIP. A negative ￿ coe¢ cient has a surprising economic interpretation.
When the domestic interest rate is higher than the foreign interest rate, the
domestic currency on average appreciates (rather than depreciates by enough
to exactly o⁄set the interest rate di⁄erential, as predicted by UIP). The common
￿nding of a negative ￿ coe¢ cient is known as the ￿forward premium puzzle￿or
￿forward discount bias￿ , since it implies that the forward market systematically
mispredicts the direction of currency movements.6
Chinn (2006) runs UIP regressions using data from the G7 countries over the
period 1980-2000 and does not ￿nd any evidence that the puzzle is becoming less
pronounced over time. However, UIP seems to hold better at longer horizons.
Most early studies which rejected the UIP hypothesis used data from industrial
countries with ￿ oating exchange rates. More recent work, for example that by
4Assume that CIP did not hold, for example that a positive forward premium (ft;t+k ￿st)
is smaller than a positive interest di⁄erential (it ￿ i￿
t). In other words, the positive interest
di⁄erential more than compensates for the expected depreciation of the domestic currency
in the forward market. Then it would be pro￿table to borrow abroad at the low foreign
interest rate, exchange the foreign currency into domestic currency, invest the money at the
high domestic interest rate and sell forward the returns in domestic currency. The interest
rate gain would be larger than the currency loss, thus making a riskless pro￿t possible. Such
riskless pro￿t opportunities will be arbitraged away, regardless of investor risk preferences.
5For surveys of the empirical literature, see Froot and Thaler (1990), Engel (1996), Isard
(2006) and Chinn (2006).
6In equation (4), let us replace the interest di⁄erential by the forward premium. Suppose
that the forward market predicts that the domestic currency will appreciate. The forward
premium term (ft;t+k ￿ st) is negative, so there is a forward discount. Then, a negative ￿
coe¢ cient implies that the (average) actual currency movement will be the opposite of the
prediction of the forward market; the domestic currency will depreciate.
6Flood and Rose (1996) and Bansal and Dahlquist (2000), also studies countries
with ￿xed exchange rates and emerging economies. Flood and Rose (1996)
￿nd that UIP holds better for ￿xed exchange rates than for ￿ oating exchange
rates. The authors point out that there is no theoretical reason to expect any
di⁄erence across exchange rate regimes, but that the potential empirical peso
problem is only present in ￿xed exchange rate countries. The problem arises
when the sample includes periods when the interest rate is high to compensate
for a small-probability, major depreciation, but is too short to include such
depreciations. Thus, to the extent that the peso problem is a signi￿cant cause of
UIP deviations in countries with ￿xed exchange rates, we should expect UIP to
hold better empirically in countries with ￿ oating exchange rates. The evidence
to the contrary presented in the paper is therefore puzzling. In contrast, Flood
and Rose (2001) ￿nd that UIP, if anything, holds better for ￿ oating exchange
rate countries, and they do not ￿nd any signi￿cant di⁄erences between countries
with di⁄erent income levels. Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) ￿nd that the forward
premium puzzle is only present in industrial countries where the interest rates
are lower than the U.S. interest rate, and not in emerging markets. Frankel and
Poonawala (2006) also ￿nd smaller deviations from UIP for emerging markets.
A paper by Poghosyan, Kocenda, and Zemcik (2008) investigates whether
UIP holds in Armenia. The authors use the fact that Armenian banks o⁄er
households a choice between domestic and foreign currency accounts. Such
deposit accounts only di⁄er in currency denomination and therefore provide
useful interest rate data for tests of UIP. The authors ￿nd that UIP holds
better than in many other studies, but there is evidence of positive and time-
varying deviations from UIP, such that holders of domestic currency earn a
higher average return. The paper investigates whether an a¢ ne term structure
framework and GARCH-M methodology can produce such time-varying risk
7premia and obtain mixed results.
Some similar empirical work has been carried out at Banco Central de Bo-
livia. However, there are certain problems with the data and the empirical
methodology. Morales (2003) estimates a version of the standard UIP regres-
sion with a yearly horizon using monthly data on domestic deposit rates for
the period 1990-2003. He ￿nds signi￿cant deviations from UIP. The main prob-
lem with the study is that Morales uses an average of interest rates across all
available maturities, which is inconsistent with the yearly horizon used in the
empirical speci￿cation. Another problem is that the combination of a yearly
horizon and monthly observations induces moving-average serial correlation into
the residuals, which is not taken into account in the estimation (Newey-West
standard errors must be used). Finally, both the interest rate and the exchange
rate data are monthly averages. Daily data or at least weekly averages would
be preferable.
Morales also investigates the ability of the Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) model
to account for dollarization in Bolivia since the early 1990￿ s. The model assumes
that UIP holds and that depositors￿choice of currency portfolio depends on the
volatilities of real returns in dollars and bolivianos. The model does poorly and
Morales views this as evidence against the time-varying risk premium expla-
nation of UIP deviations. Therefore, he interprets all deviations from UIP as
stemming from peso problems.
Esc￿bar (2003) uses interbank interest rates and ￿nds evidence of non-
cointegration between the interest di⁄erential and depreciation, which is natu-
rally very problematic for the UIP hypothesis. However, the empirical methods
su⁄er from the same problems as those in Morales￿paper.
83 Di⁄erent explanations for the empirical devi-
ations from UIP and how to test them
As discussed in the previous section, there is abundant empirical evidence
against UIP. But what are the underlying causes of the empirical deviations
from UIP? There are three main explanations in the literature: the peso prob-
lem, time-varying risk premia and deviations from rational expectations.7
Before discussing these di⁄erent explanations in more detail, it should be
noted that the economic importance of deviations from UIP has been questioned
by some authors. Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2006) argue
that deviations from UIP do not necessarily imply unexploited pro￿t opportu-
nities, and that statistically signi￿cant deviations are of little economic signif-
icance. Similarly, Sarno, Valente, and Leon (2006) ￿nd evidence of nonlinear
deviations from UIP, which is consistent with limits to speculation. Neverthe-
less, UIP is a key assumption in many macroeconomic models and a better un-
derstanding of empirical deviations from parity remains an important research
challenge.
3.1 The peso problem
The peso problem (named after the Mexican currency) has been prominent
in policy discussions in Bolivia and is viewed as a likely explanation for UIP
deviations. If the sample is short and includes periods when investors put a
small, but positive, probability on a large depreciation, but does not include
periods when such large depreciations actually occur, then the estimated beta
coe¢ cient will have a downward bias. Domestic interest rates will tend to be
high to compensate for an expected depreciation, but an actual depreciation
7Other explanations are monetary policy responses to exchange rate changes (McCallum
(1994)), endogenous asset market segmentation (Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2009)) and
infrequent portfolio decisions (Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2009)).
9does not occur in the sample.8 Flood and Rose (1996) try to quantify the peso
problem bias by testing UIP for two di⁄erent samples of ￿xed exchange rate
data: one full sample including realignment periods and one smaller sample
excluding such periods. The estimated ￿ coe¢ cient for the full sample should
not su⁄er from any bias, while the estimate using the smaller sample should be
biased downwards due to the peso problem. By comparing the two estimated ￿
coe¢ cients, the authors estimate the peso problem bias to be -0.5.
Another possible explanation for UIP deviations, which is also related to
expectations, is gradual investor learning of exchange rate regime shifts, for
example from ￿xed to ￿ oating. Lewis (1989) ￿nds some evidence of such expec-
tational errors, but notes that they do not seem to decrease over time, which
contradicts the learning hypothesis.
3.2 Time-varying risk premia
A second possible explanation for UIP deviations is a time-varying risk premium
which is correlated with the expected depreciation and thus with the interest
di⁄erential. Any time-varying risk premium is part of the residual in the UIP
regression and its correlation with the regressor causes the estimated beta coef-
￿cient to be biased. The issue is best understood by decomposing the interest
rate di⁄erential into an expected depreciation and a risk premium.9 The de-
composition can be expressed as i ￿ i￿ = E(depr) + rp, where i ￿ i￿ is the
interest rate di⁄erential, E(depr) is the expected depreciation and rp denotes
the risk premium. Using the expression to substitute for the interest di⁄erential
in equation (4), the ￿ coe¢ cient can be expressed as follows:
￿ =
Cov(depr;i ￿ i￿)
V ar(i ￿ i￿)
=
V ar(E(depr)) + Cov(rp;E(depr))
V ar(rp) + V ar(E(depr)) + 2Cov(rp;E(depr))
: (5)
8See Rogo⁄ (1980) and Krasker (1980) for early discussions of the peso problem and Lewis
(1995) for a survey.
9See Fama (1984) and Hodrick and Srivastava (1986) for more details.
10First, suppose that the risk premium is constant (V ar(rp) = 0), which implies
that the covariance between the risk premium and expected depreciation is zero
(Cov(rp;E(depr)) = 0). Then we have ￿ = 1 and thus UIP holds. In contrast,
suppose that Cov(rp;E(depr)) < 0 and that V ar(rp) > jCov(rp;E(depr))j >
V ar(E(depr)): Under these conditions ￿ is negative and thus there is a forward
premium puzzle. Intuitively, investors demand such a large risk premium for
holding risky high-interest rate currencies that those currencies are expected to
appreciate rather than depreciate. Holders of the risky currencies are compen-
sated both by higher interest rates and by currency appreciation.
There are three di⁄erent methods that have been used to test the risk pre-
mium explanation. One approach for testing the risk premium explanation is to
examine whether the predictable excess returns caused by the forward discount
bias can be explained by the expected variance of future returns. Domowitz and
Hakkio (1985) were the ￿rst authors to use an autoregressive conditional het-
eroscedasticity (ARCH) model to obtain a measure of the expected variance. A
second approach is to use a fundamentals-based model of time-varying risk pre-
mia, as in, for example, Giovannini and Jorion (1989). Finally, a third method
for testing the risk premium explanation is to obtain a survey-based measure
of expected depreciation rather than to rely on ex-post depreciation as a proxy.
Froot and Frankel (1990) use a survey measure of expected depreciation to de-
compose the estimation bias into a risk premium bias and an expectational bias.
They ￿nd that although the risk premium varies over time, it is not correlated
with the expected depreciation and hence it cannot cause a downward bias in
￿. Instead, there is evidence of systematic prediction errors.
113.3 Deviations from rational expectations
The third and ￿nal possible explanation for the deviations from UIP is deviations
from rational expectations. Froot and Thaler (1990) discuss the hypothesis that
at least some investors respond to interest rate di⁄erentials with a lag. The
hypothesis is testable, since it predicts that not only current but also lagged
interest di⁄erentials a⁄ect the exchange rate in a UIP regression. Froot (1990)
presents supportive empirical evidence. Similarly, Chinn (2006) ￿nds that UIP
holds better when using survey-based measures of expected depreciation.
4 An empirical test of UIP in Bolivia - data and
results
4.1 The data set
The data set has been compiled from the Monthly Bulletins of Banco Central
de Bolivia. It consists of weekly averages for nominal deposit interest rates in
Bolivia for the period April 1994 ￿November 2006 and daily observations on
the boliviano-dollar exchange rate for the same period. There are a number
of di⁄erent deposit rates which di⁄er in terms of currency denomination (boli-
vianos or U.S. dollars) and maturity range (1-30, 31-60, 61-90, 91-180, 181-360
or 361-720 days). Data is also available on interbank rates and sight deposit
rates. However, as pointed out by Esc￿bar (2003), interbank and sight deposit
transactions are primarily made for transaction rather than investment pur-
poses, which makes such rates less relevant for testing UIP. In Bolivia, there is
no forward market, so I use the interest di⁄erential speci￿cation rather than the
equivalent forward discount speci￿cation.
Figure 1 presents the boliviano-dollar interest di⁄erential and depreciation
















Figure 1: Deposit interest rate di⁄erential (boliviano-dollar) and depreciation
of boliviano for the interest rate maturity range 1-30 days.
for the interest rate maturity range 1-30 days. The interest di⁄erential between
bolivianos and dollars is always positive, i.e. deposits denominated in bolivianos
yield a higher interest rate. Moreover, depreciation is generally positive, so the
value of the boliviano against the dollar falls over time.
Some data transformations are necessary before proceeding to the empirical
testing. The interest rate data are weekly; each observation is a weekly average
of the interest rates registered for all deposit transactions during the week. In
contrast, the exchange rate data are daily. To get the same frequency for all se-
ries, I convert the daily exchange rate data to a weekly frequency by calculating
the average exchange rate for each week.
Another issue is that the exact interest rate maturity for each maturity range
is not observable in the data. For example, should we match the interest rate
with a 31-60 day maturity with the depreciation for, say, 33, 48 or 56 days? I
131-30 31-60 61-90 91-180 181-360 361-720
Mean 30 52 85 160 294 414
(Std dev) (0) (9) (7) (21) (53) (88)
Mean 30 40 86 155 245 398
(Std dev) (0) (10) (8) (27) (73) (1)
N/A 0.03** 0.85 0.87 0.97 0.04**
30 46 85 158 265 406
4 7 12 23 38 58 Average maturity
(weeks)
Note: the table presents average interest maturities for the different maturity ranges. The
t-test p-value presented in the table is the p-value for a two-sided t-test for pairs of
average maturities (weighted by transaction amount) for each currency, maturity range
and date. The null hypothesis is that the pair of average maturities is generated from









deal with this problem by examining individual deposit transaction data for 12
speci￿c dates during the period 2001-2006 (end-May and end-November). First,
for each date, I calculated the volume-weighted average maturity within each
range (separately for boliviano and dollar deposits). Second, I calculated the
average maturity across the 12 dates within each range (separately for bolivianos
and dollars). Finally, for each maturity range, I took the average of the boliviano
and dollar maturities to get one single maturity for each range. The results are
presented in Table 1. The data in the 1-30 day range are particularly reliable,
since the transactions have exactly a 30-day maturity in all cases examined. In
most other cases, the di⁄erence between the boliviano and dollar maturities is
insigni￿cant. The only exceptions are the maturity ranges 31-60 and 361-720
days, where the di⁄erence in maturity between boliviano and dollar interest rates
is statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level. However, the estimated di⁄erence
in maturity is only 10-15 days, so in quantitative terms the problem is not
important.
Before proceeding to the estimation, I carry out a number of unit root tests
14ADF_CT ADF_C ADF_N PP_CT PP_C PP_N
0.00*** 0.59 0.08* 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.06*
0.21 0.88 0.04** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.20
0.05* 0.66 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.10*
0.05* 0.08* 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.06*
0.00*** 0.31 0.03** 0.00*** 0.11 0.28
0.29 0.15 0.08* 0.00*** 0.10 0.31
0.55 0.87 0.04** 0.07* 0.81 0.07*
0.81 0.83 0.04** 0.00*** 0.73 0.10
0.42 0.75 0.10 0.02** 0.72 0.09*
0.87 0.78 0.07* 0.43 0.67 0.11
0.66 0.71 0.14 0.00*** 0.50 0.14
0.77 0.77 0.12 0.07* 0.60 0.19
Depr 1-30 0.53 0.37 0.19 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Depr 31-60 0.73 0.57 0.23 0.01** 0.00*** 0.03**
Depr 61-90 0.83 0.74 0.32 0.17 0.07* 0.05*
Depr 91-180 0.86 0.75 0.29 0.88 0.75 0.25
Depr 181-360 0.95 0.92 0.39 0.96 0.92 0.38









Unit root tests for interest rate and depreciation variables
USD 31-60
Note: the table presents p-values for various unit root tests for the interest rate and
depreciation variables for different maturities. BOB denotes the boliviano interest rate in
Bolivia, USD is the US dollar interest rate in Bolivia and Depr is depreciation. The unit
root tests are ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) and PP (Phillips-Perron) using different
assumption regarding the deterministic regressor (CT = constant and trend,
C = constant and N = no constant or trend). ***, ** and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.






for the following variables (for each maturity range): interest rate in bolivianos,
interest rate in dollars and depreciation. The results are presented in Table 2.
With the exception of the depreciation variables for the longer maturity ranges,
the null hypothesis of a unit root is always rejected by at least some of the
tests. Moreover, the non-rejection cases could be partially due to the low power
of unit root tests. In the following, I treat all variables as stationary.
154.2 Empirical results: does UIP hold in Bolivia?
I do not use the standard UIP regression equation (4) since the approximation
that x is close to ln(1 + x) only holds for small x, and interest rates in Bolivia
have at times been quite high. Without the approximation and lagging by k
periods, the following regression equation is obtained:
st ￿ st￿k = ￿ + ￿[ln(1 + it￿k) ￿ ln(1 + i￿
t￿k)] + "t: (6)
I present the OLS estimation results in Table 3. The estimated ￿ is much
lower than 1 for each maturity range and the UIP restriction ￿ = 1 is always
rejected. However, the estimated ￿ coe¢ cients are larger than those obtained
in many other studies, where the coe¢ cients are often negative (for developed
countries) or close to zero (for emerging markets). The point estimates of ￿ are
positive in all cases. For the three shortest maturity ranges, the coe¢ cients are
signi￿cant at the 5% or 10% level, with point estimates of 0.31, 0.20 and 0.21,
respectively. For the longer maturity ranges, the coe¢ cients are closer to zero
and insigni￿cant. To some extent this could be due to measurement error in the
longer-maturity interest rate data (which would cause a downward bias).10
These results are clearly more favorable to UIP than those previously ob-
tained for developed countries, where the coe¢ cients are often negative. They
are also more favorable than previous results for emerging markets. Bansal and
Dahlquist (2000) pool data from a number of emerging market countries and
estimate a coe¢ cient of 0.19, but with a standard error of 0.19. In sum, UIP
does not hold in Bolivia, but the deviations are smaller than in previous studies.
The question is whether the relative success of UIP in Bolivia is due to the
high-quality data set ￿with better dollar interest rate data than in existing
10In contrast, Chinn (2006) ￿nds that UIP fails less clearly at longer horizons (using data
from developed countries).
161-30 31-60 61-90 91-180 181-360 361-720
α 2.76*** 3.32*** 3.37*** 3.77*** 3.59*** 3.37***
(0.84) (0.73) (0.72) (0.66) (0.65) (0.82)
β 0.31** 0.20* 0.21* 0.13 0.10 0.02
(0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11)
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: the estimated equation is s(t)-s(t-k) = α+β[ln(1+i(t-k))-ln(1+i*(t-k))]+ε(t)
where s is the log exchange rate (defined as bolivianos per dollar) and k is
the interest rate maturity in weeks for each range (from Table 1). The
depreciation variable was multiplied by 52/k to get an annualized measure
corresponding to the annual interest rates. Newey-West standard errors
(robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation) are reported in
parenthesis. The reported p-value is associated with the chi-square statistic
for a Wald test of the restriction β=1 (which holds under UIP). ***, ** and *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
OLS estimation of standard UIP regression
Table 3
Maturity range (days)
studies for emerging markets ￿or whether the results would be similar using
more standard data for the dollar interest rate. In particular, would the results
di⁄er substantially if we used interest rates on certi￿cates of deposit (CODs)
in the United States instead of interest rates on dollar-denominated deposits in
Bolivia? First of all, let us graphically compare the interest rate series in Figure
2. During most of the sample period, the Bolivian dollar-deposit interest rate
is higher than the US COD interest rate, but since 2004 the opposite has been
true. The correlations between the series are high, ranging from 0.73 for the
shortest maturity to 0.80 for the longest maturity.
I re-estimate equation (6) using the US COD interest rate instead of the
Bolivian dollar deposit rate. The results are presented in Table 4. The estimates
are strikingly similar to those reported above, which indicates that political risk
was not a signi￿cant cause of UIP deviations during the sample period. There
is almost no di⁄erence in results for the shortest maturity range. For the longer
maturity ranges, the coe¢ cients on the interest rate variables are, if anything,
somewhat more positive and signi￿cant when using US COD rates. In contrast,

















Figure 2: Interest rates on dollar-denominated deposits in Bolivia and Certi￿-
cates of Deposit (CODs) in the United States (30-day maturities).
Poghosyan, Kocenda, and Zemcik (2008) ￿nd larger deviations from UIP in the
cross-country case. The restriction ￿ = 1 is rejected at the 1% level for all
maturity ranges. The similarity of the results in Tables 3 and 4 suggests that
it may be worthwhile to test UIP even in developing countries which are not
partially dollarized and where it would be necessary to use US COD rates rather
than local dollar-deposit rates.
5 Explaining the deviations from UIP in Bolivia
Previous tests of UIP in Bolivia do not investigate the underlying reasons for
the empirical deviations from UIP. Morales (2003) attributes any deviations
from UIP to the peso problem, but he does not test the explanatory value of
di⁄erent theories. This section studies the following three candidate explana-







Note: the estimated equation is s(t)-s(t-k) = α+β[ln(1+i(t-k))-ln(1+i*(t-k))]+ε(t)
where s is the log exchange rate (defined as bolivianos per dollar) and k is
the interest rate maturity in weeks for each range. See Table 3 for additional
notes. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
OLS estimation of standard UIP regression





5.1 How much can the peso problem explain?
Suppose that investors put a small, but positive, probability on a major depre-
ciation of the domestic currency and, therefore, require high interest rates as
compensation, but suppose that no such major depreciations actually occur in
the sample. Then, the estimated beta coe¢ cient will have a downward bias due
to a ￿peso problem￿(as discussed in subsection 3.1).
In the Bolivian case, the interest rate di⁄erentials presented in Figure 1 are
almost always positive, and no major depreciation occurs in the sample. On
average, the interest di⁄erential in favor of the boliviano was more than su¢ -
ciently large to compensate for depreciation. Thus, on average, the deviations
from UIP follow the prediction of the peso problem explanation.
Froot and Thaler (1990) carry out some simple calculations to informally
evaluate the peso problem as an explanation for the dollar appreciation in the
early 1980￿ s. It is instructive to perform a similar calculation for Bolivia during
the sample period. In this period, the average depreciation of the boliviano was
4:5% per year. Suppose that the depositors expected this to be the ￿normal￿
19depreciation rate, given no major depreciation, but that depositors put some
probability on a very large depreciation of, say, 50%. The expected depreciation
would be equal to the yearly probability ￿ of a major depreciation times 50%,
plus the yearly probability (1 ￿ ￿) of a small depreciation times 4:5%. More-
over, suppose that, in fact, UIP held perfectly during the sample period (i.e.
any empirical deviations are only due to empirical peso problems). Then, the
expected depreciation must be equal to the interest rate di⁄erential of 6%.
Given these assumptions, it is possible to solve for the yearly probability of
a major depreciation by solving the equation:
0:06 = ￿ ￿ 0:5 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 0:045 (7)
which gives ￿ = 0:033. The yearly probability of a major depreciation would
be 3:3%, so the probability of not observing such an event in the sample would
be (1 ￿ ￿)^12 = 67%. This ￿p-value￿is obviously not su¢ ciently low to reject
the ￿null hypothesis￿ of the peso problem being responsible for all empirical
deviations from UIP in Bolivia.11 These calculations show that the peso problem
alone might possibly account for the observed data. However, the calculation
only shows that this possibility cannot be excluded, so it is important to also
investigate the ability of other factors to explain deviations from UIP.
5.2 How much can time-varying risk premia explain?
I use generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity in mean
(GARCH-M) modeling to examine the explanatory value of a time-varying risk
premium, modeled as the expected variance of future returns. This approach
follows Domowitz and Hakkio (1985), Tai (2001) and Poghosyan, Kocenda, and
11Varying the size of the hypothetical depreciation between 30% and 70%, the ￿p-value￿
only varies between around 50% and 75%. Thus, the result is robust to the assumed size of
the major depreciation.
20α β γ c a b
6.19*** -0.10*** -0.03*** 0.85*** 0.78*** 0.22***
(0.14) (0.03) (0.00) (0.17) (0.09) (0.07)
Note: the estimated mean equation is s(t) - s(t-k) = α + β[ln(1+i(t-k)) -
ln(1+i*(t-k))] + γ˃^2(t-k)+ ʵ(t) where s is the log exchange rate (defined as
bolivianos per dollar) and k is the interest rate maturity in weeks for each
range (from Table 1). The variance equation is˃^2(t-k) = c + aʵ^2(t-k-1) +
b˃^2(t-k-1). Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors (robust to non-normality in
the residuals) are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
ML estimation of GARCH(1,1)-M model for 1-30 days
Coefficient (standard errors in parenthesis)
Table 5
Zemcik (2008). The methodology can also be motivated empirically; for all
maturity ranges, OLS regressions show clear signs of ARCH (not reported).
Speci￿cally, I estimate a GARCH (1, 1)-M model.12 I present the results for
the maturity range 1-30 days in Table 5. All coe¢ cients are highly signi￿cant
and there are clear deviations from UIP. The restriction ￿ = 1 is rejected at the
1% level for all maturity ranges. Moreover, the coe¢ cient for the conditional
variance in the mean equation (￿) is signi￿cantly negative, indicating the pres-
ence of a time-varying risk premium. Intuitively, when uncertainty increases (￿
goes up), the depreciation of the boliviano decreases, thus causing the expected
returns from holding bolivianos to increase. The increase in expected returns
is required by agents to compensate for the additional risk involved in holding
bolivianos when uncertainty is high.
The estimated risk premium consists of a constant part, ￿, and a time-
varying part, ￿ ￿￿2. Wald tests reject the null hypothesis of no risk premium at
the 1% level. The estimated premium is presented in Figure 3 and it is large,
positive and time-varying throughout the sample period. Thus, there is clear
empirical evidence of a time-varying risk premium, which could account for at
least part of the deviations from UIP.
12Before making the estimation, missing values in the interest rate series were replaced by
the average value of adjacent observations.















Figure 3: Estimated risk premium (￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿2) for the interest rate maturity
range 1-30 days.
However, a puzzling result is that the estimated coe¢ cient on the interest
rate di⁄erential goes from signi￿cantly positive (in the standard UIP regression)
to signi￿cantly negative (in the GARCH-M regression). If the deviation from
UIP were caused by a downward bias in ￿ due to an omitted risk premium,
the estimated ￿ coe¢ cient would be expected to increase rather than decrease
when explicitly modeling the risk premium. Interestingly, Domowitz and Hakkio
(1985) obtain the same result for the two countries (United Kingdom and Japan)
for which they ￿nd a signi￿cant risk premium.
Another approach for dealing with possible endogeneity bias due to an omit-
ted risk premium is to use instrumental variables (IV) methods rather than OLS.
Instrumental-variables estimation of equation (6), using lagged interest di⁄er-
entials for the past 26 weeks as instruments for the current interest di⁄erential,
gives similar results as OLS, but the ￿ coe¢ cients are generally somewhat higher
22(not reported). UIP is still rejected, but the deviations are smaller. Thus, while
GARCH-M estimation gives mixed results, the IV estimates indicate that time-
varying risk premia may be partially responsible for the empirical deviations
from UIP in Bolivia.13
5.3 How much can deviations from rational expectations
explain?
I test the non-rational expectations hypothesis presented in Froot and Thaler
(1990). The hypothesis is that at least some investors respond with a lag to
interest rate di⁄erentials. Table 6 presents estimation results for speci￿cations
including lagged interest-rate di⁄erentials for the past 26 weeks (only ￿ and ￿
coe¢ cients are shown in the table). There are no substantial changes in the
estimated ￿ coe¢ cient for any maturity range. However, the coe¢ cients on
the lagged interest rate di⁄erentials are jointly signi￿cant at the 1% level in
two cases (for maturity ranges 61-90 and 181-360 days). Hence, there is some
empirical evidence in favor of non-rational expectations.
6 Conclusions
The main ￿nding of this paper is that while UIP does not hold in Bolivia, the
deviations are smaller than in previous studies using data from developed or
emerging economies. Moreover, several factors seem to have contributed to the
observed deviations from UIP. The peso problem could possibly account for
the observed data, but there is also evidence of a time-varying risk premium, as
well as deviations from rational expectations. More generally, one would a priori
expect the peso problem to be especially relevant in Bolivia with its history of
13Another interpretation would be that the OLS estimates have a downward bias due to
measurement error in the interest rate data. Interest rates are measured as weekly averages
and interest maturity is not measured perfectly.
231-30 31-60 61-90 91-180 181-360
α 2.89** 1.71 2.82*** -1.02 -0.21
(1.23) (1.22) (1.05) (1.09) (0.15)
β 0.20 0.33** 0.30*** 0.24 0.01
(0.14) (0.15) (0.10) (0.16) (0.03)
P-value 0.74 0.92 0.01 0.11 0.00
Note: the estimated equation is s(t)-s(t-k) = α + β[ln(1+i(t-k))-
ln(1+i*(t-k))] + c(1)[ln(1+i(t-k-1))-ln(1+i*(t-k-1))] +...+
c(26)[ln(1+i(t-k-26))-ln(1+i*(t-k-26))]+ε(t) where s is the log
exchange rate (defined as bolivianos per dollar) and k is the
interest rate maturity in weeks for each range (from Table 1). The
depreciation variable was multiplied by 52/k to get an annualized
measure corresponding to the annual interest rates. Newey-West
standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation)
are reported in parenthesis. The reported p-value is associated
with the chi-square statistic for a Wald test of the significance of
the coefficients for the lagged interest rate terms. ***, ** and *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
Table 6
OLS estimation of standard UIP regression with
lagged interest rate terms on the RHS
(test for deviations from rational expectations)
Maturity range (days)
hyperin￿ ation than in other countries. Therefore, the ￿nding that deviations
from UIP are smaller in the Bolivian case than in previous studies casts doubt
on the peso problem as the main factor behind the general empirical failure of
UIP.
Future research could test UIP with similar data from other partially dol-
larized developing economies. It would be particularly interesting to investigate
whether a surprising result in this paper￿ that the UIP tests gave similar results
irrespective of which dollar interest rate was used￿ holds more generally.
Another possibility would be to use pooled data from several partially dollar-
ized countries rather than time-series data for separate countries. The drawback
of the single-country approach used in this paper is that the estimates may be
imprecise in small samples. Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) show that even when
UIP holds, persistent exchange rate volatility might cause a wide dispersion of
estimated ￿ coe¢ cients around the true value of one. However, the Bolivian
24data set consists of weekly data for a 12-year period, which gives a relatively
large number of observations. Moreover, Flood and Rose (2001) test for UIP
in individual countries using large samples and still obtain estimation results
which vary considerably between countries. They argue that this makes pooling
￿i.e. estimating a single ￿ for all countries ￿a somewhat dubious procedure.
There are also data availability problems; it is likely to be di¢ cult to ￿nd high-
frequency interest rate data of su¢ ciently similar maturity for a large number
of countries.
25References
Adolfson, M., S. LasØen, J. LindØ, and M. Villani (2008): ￿Evaluat-
ing an Estimated New Keynesian Small Open Economy Model,￿Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 32(8), 2690￿ 2721.
Aliber, R. Z. (1973): ￿The Interest Rate Parity Theorem: A Reinterpreta-
tion,￿Journal of Political Economy, 81(6), 1451￿ 1459.
Alvarez, F., A. Atkeson, and P. J. Kehoe (2009): ￿Time-Varying Risk,
Interest Rates, and Exchange Rates in General Equilibrium,￿Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, forthcoming.
Asplund, M., and R. Friberg (2001): ￿The Law of One Price in Scandinavian
Duty-Free Stores,￿American Economic Review, 91(4), 1072￿ 1083.
Baba, N., and F. Packer (2008): ￿Interpreting Deviations from Covered In-
terest Parity During the Financial Market Turmoil of 2007-08,￿BIS Working
Paper No. 267.
Bacchetta, P., and E. van Wincoop (2009): ￿Infrequent Portfolio De-
cisions: A Solution to the Forward Discount Puzzle,￿ American Economic
Review, forthcoming.
Baillie, R. T., and T. Bollerslev (2000): ￿The Forward Premium Anomaly
Is Not As Bad As You Think,￿Journal of International Money and Finance,
19(4), 471￿ 488.
Bansal, R., and M. Dahlquist (2000): ￿The Forward Premium Puzzle: Dif-
ferent Tales from Developed and Emerging Economies,￿Journal of Interna-
tional Economics, 51(1), 115￿ 144.
Burnside, C., M. Eichenbaum, I. Kleshchelski, and S. Rebelo (2006):
￿The Returns to Currency Speculation,￿NBER Working Paper No. 12489.
Chinn, M. D. (2006): ￿The (Partial) Rehabilitation of Interest Rate Parity
in the Floating Rate Era: Longer Horizons, Alternative Expectations, and
Emerging Markets,￿Journal of Development Economics, 25(1), 7￿ 21.
Domowitz, I., and C. S. Hakkio (1985): ￿Conditional Variance and the
Risk Premium in the Foreign Exchange Market,￿ Journal of International
Economics, 19(1-2), 47￿ 66.
Dooley, M. P., and P. Isard (1980): ￿Capital Controls, Political Risk, and
Deviations from Interest-Rate Parity,￿Journal of Political Economy, 88(2),
370￿ 384.
Engel, C. (1996): ￿The Forward Discount Anomaly and the Risk Premium:
A Survey of Recent Evidence,￿Journal of Empirical Finance, 3(2), 123￿ 192.
26Esc￿bar, F. (2003): ￿Efectos de las Variaciones del Tipo de Cambio Sobre las
Actividades de Intermediaci￿n Financiera de Bolivia: 1990-2003,￿Revista de
AnÆlisis, 6(1), 73￿ 123, Banco Central de Bolivia.
Fama, E. F. (1984): ￿Forward and Spot Exchange Rates,￿Journal of Monetary
Economics, 14(3), 319￿ 338.
Flood, R. P., and A. K. Rose (1996): ￿Fixes: Of the Forward Discount
Puzzle,￿Review of Economics and Statistics, 78(4), 748￿ 752.
(2001): ￿Uncovered Interest Parity in Crisis: The Interest Rate Defense
in the 1990s,￿IMF Working Paper 01/207.
Frankel, J. A., and J. Poonawala (2006): ￿The Forward Market in Emerg-
ing Currencies: Less Biased Than in Major Currencies,￿ NBER Working
Paper No. 12496.
Froot, K. A. (1990): ￿Short Rates and Expected Asset Returns,￿ NBER
Working Paper No. 3247.
Froot, K. A., and J. A. Frankel (1990): ￿Forward Discount Bias: Is It an
Exchange Risk Premium?,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(1), 139￿ 161.
Froot, K. A., and R. H. Thaler (1990): ￿Anomalies: Foreign Exchange,￿
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4(3), 179￿ 192.
Giovannini, A., and P. Jorion (1989): ￿The Time Variation of Risk and
Return in the Foreign Exchange and Stock Markets,￿ Journal of Finance,
44(2), 307￿ 325.
Hodrick, R. J., and S. Srivastava (1986): ￿The Covariation of Risk Pre-
miums and Expected Future Spot Exchange Rates,￿Journal of International
Money and Finance, 5, S5￿ S21.
Isard, P. (2006): ￿Uncovered Interest Parity,￿IMF Working Paper 06/96.
Ize, A., and E. Levy Yeyati (2003): ￿Financial Dollarization,￿ Journal of
International Economics, 59(2), 323￿ 347.
Krasker, W. S. (1980): ￿The Peso Problem in Testing the E¢ ciency of For-
ward Exchange Markets,￿Journal of Monetary Economics, 6(2), 269￿ 276.
Lewis, K. K. (1989): ￿Changing Beliefs and Systematic Rational Forecast
Errors with Evidence from Foreign Exchange,￿American Economic Review,
79(4), 621￿ 636.
(1995): ￿Puzzles in International Financial Markets,￿in Handbook of
International Economics: Volume 3, ed. by G. M. Grossman, and K. Rogo⁄,
pp. 1913￿ 1949. North Holland, Amsterdam.
27McCallum, B. T. (1994): ￿A Reconsideration of the Uncovered Interest Parity
Relationship,￿Journal of Monetary Economics, 33(1), 105￿ 132.
Morales, J. A. (2003): ￿Dollarization of Assets and Liabilities: Problem or
Solution? The Case of Bolivia,￿Revista de AnÆlisis, 6(1), 7￿ 40, Banco Central
de Bolivia.
Poghosyan, T., E. Kocenda, and P. Zemcik (2008): ￿Modeling Foreign
Exchange Risk Premium in Armenia,￿Emerging Markets Finance and Trade,
44(1), 41￿ 61.
Rogoff, K. (1980): ￿Tests of the Martingale Model for Foreign Exchange
Futures Markets,￿in Essays on Expectations and Exchange Rate Volatility.
Doctoral dissertation, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT.
Sarno, L., G. Valente, and H. Leon (2006): ￿Nonlinearity in Deviations
from Uncovered Interest Parity: An Explanation of the Forward Bias Puzzle,￿
Review of Finance, 10(3), 443￿ 482.
Tai, C.-S. (2001): ￿A Multivariate GARCH in Mean Approach to Testing Un-
covered Interest Parity: Evidence from Asia-Paci￿c Foreign Exchange Mar-
kets,￿Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 41(4), 441￿ 460.
28